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Abstract: This paper deals with the robust H∞ cyber-attacks estimation problem for control systems under stochastic cyber-
attacks and disturbances. The focus is on designing a H∞ lter which maximize the attack sensitivity and minimize the effect
of disturbances. The design requires not only the disturbance attenuation, but also the residual to remain the attack sensitivity as
much as possible while the effect of disturbance is minimized. A stochastic model of control system with stochastic cyber-attacks
which satisfy the Markovian stochastic process is constructed. And we also present the stochastic attack models that a control
system is possibly exposed to. Furthermore, applying H∞ ltering technique-based on linear matrix inequalities (LMIs), the
paper obtains sufcient conditions that ensure the ltering error dynamic is asymptotically stable and satises a prescribed ratio
between cyber-attack sensitivity and disturbance sensitivity. Finally, the results are applied to the control of a Quadruple-tank
process (QTP) under a stochastic cyber-attack and a stochastic disturbance. The simulation results underline that the designed
lters is effective and feasible in practical application.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, the problem of cyber-attacks on controlled
systems has attracted considerable attention [1]-[9]. Un-
like traditional information technology (IT) system where
cyber-security mainly involves the protection of data, cyber-
attacks on control systems may inuence the physical pro-
cesses through the communication infrastructure. It will no
doubt increase the challenging of networked control sys-
tems security and the detection and isolation of these threats.
These challenging requirements increase the interest of re-
searchers in the development of cyber-attack fault detection
and isolation (FDI) techniques [3]-[4] and fault estimation
methods. In the recent literatures, [5]-[6] proposed the cen-
tralized FDI schemes; [7]-[8] proposed the distributed FDI
schemes. Moreover, it is well know that the fault estima-
tion about complex cyber-attacks can signicantly affect the
safe and reliable operation of infrastructures. The main state
estimators have Kalman lter and H∞ lter. In contrast to
the traditional Kalman lter, the advantage of the H∞ l-
ter is insensitive to the exact knowledge of systems state
model, the stochastic properties of cyber-attacks and the dis-
turbances. In addition, the H∞ ltering technique can give
a quantization upper bound based on the disturbance attenu-
ation performance, which can maximize the fault sensitivity
on the estimated signals and then identify the vulnerabilities
of control systems as far as possible. However, as we know
in our area of expertise, not so much research applying H∞
lter technique to the security and safety of control systems,
which motivates our research in this area.
The paper presents the robust H∞ cyber-attacks estima-
tion problem for control systems under stochastic cyber-
attacks and disturbances. The basic idea is to design an ob-
server to generate residual information with regard to cyber-
attacks. Moreover the residual is required to remain the sen-
sitive of the attack signals as much as possible while increas-
ing robustness against disturbances. A stochastic model of
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control system with stochastic cyber-attacks which satisfy
the Markovian stochastic process is constructed. And we
also present the stochastic attack models that a control sys-
tem is possibly exposed to. Furthermore, applying H∞ l-
tering technique, the paper respectively designs lters for the
control system with disturbance attenuation and without dis-
turbance attenuation. Based on LMIs algorithm, the suf-
cient conditions are derived, which guarantee the asymptoti-
cal stability of the ltering error dynamic and the prescribed
H∞ performance level. Finally, the results are applied to the
control of the QTP [11] that is subject to a stochastic data
DoS attack and a stochastic disturbance. The simulation re-
sults underline that the designed lter efciently solve the
robust cyber-attacks estimation problem in practical applica-
tion.
For convenience, we adopt the following notations: I
identity matrix. L2([0,∞);Rn) space of nonanticipative
stochastic processes φ(t) with respect to ltration t sat-
isfying
‖φ(t)‖2L2

= E
∫ ∞
0
‖φ(t)‖2 dt < ∞.
E{·} mathematical expectation operator with respect to the
given probability measure P .
2 Problem Formulation
Consider the general framework to model a continuous-
time linear system under stochastic cyber-attacks and distur-
bances
.
x(t) = Ax(t) + Bu(t) + α(t)F1aak(t) + E1w(t)
x(0) = x0 (1)
y(t) = Cx(t) + β(t)F2ask(t) + E2ν(t)
where x(t) ∈ Rn is the state vector, x0 is the initial state,
y(t) ∈ Rm is the measurement output, u(t) ∈ Rr is the
known input vector. aak(t) ∈ Rr denotes the actuator cyber-
attack or the physical attack and ask(t) ∈ Rm denotes the
sensor cyber-attack. Systems noise w(t) and process noise
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v(t) are Gaussian white noises with mean 0 and covari-
ance Q and R, respectively. A,B, F1, E1,and C,F2, E2 are
known constant matrices with appropriate dimensions. α(t)
and β(t) are Markovian stochastic processes taking the val-
ues of 0 and 1 and satisfy the following probability
E{α(t)} = Pr ob {α(t) = 1} = ρ (2)
E{β(t)} = Pr ob {β(t) = 1} = σ
where event α(t) = 1 shows that the actuator of the system
is subject to a cyber-attack, so an actuator cyber-attack aak(t)
occurs; event α(t) = 0 implies no a cyber-attack on the ac-
tuator. ρ ∈ [0, 1] reects the occurrence probability of the
event that the actuator of the system is subject to a cyber-
attack. Event β(t) = 1 shows that the sensor of the systems
is subject to a cyber-attack, so systems have a sensor cyber-
attack ask(t); while event β(t) = 0 implies no a cyber-attack
on the sensor. σ ∈ [0, 1] reects the occurrence probability
of the event that the sensor is subject to a cyber-attack. As-
suming α(t) and β(t) are independent stochastic variables
and satisfy
E{α(t)β(t)} = E{α(t)}E{β(t)}. (3)
Further, assuming α(t) and β(t) are independent of mea-
surement noises w(t), v(t) and the initial state x0. The gen-
eral framework can be used to model a control system that
is subject to different kinds of cyber-attacks. Generally, at-
tacks targeting control systems can be mainly classied as
physical attack and cyber-attacks including denial-of-service
(DoS) attacks and deception attacks. In the sequel of the pa-
per, we introduce these attack models that can be modelled
by the stochastic systems model (1).
2.1 Modelling Stochastic Physical Attack
A control system may suffer from stochastic physical at-
tacks from an internal operator or a disgruntled employee or
an adversary, which often in conjunction with cyber-attacks.
The adversary can steal or damage the eld devices or the
communication devices in order to remain a cyber-attack
stealthy. For example, in [9] the adversary may damage the
water level measurements when he was attempting to pump
the water out of an irrigation system so that the cyber-attack
remains stealthy. A stochastic physical attack can be mod-
elled as
α(t) = {0, 1} , t ≥ t0
β(t) = 0 (4)
aak(t) = fk(t)
where we consider fk(t) to be the physical attack.
2.2 Modelling Stochastic Data Denial-of-Service Attack
In stochastic data DoS attacks, the objective of the ad-
versary is to prevent the actuator from receiving control
commands or the controller from receiving sensor measure-
ments. Therefore, by jamming the communication channels,
compromising devices and preventing them from sending
data, attacking the routing protocols, ooding the commu-
nication network with random data and so on, the adversary
can launch a stochastic data DoS attack. Using the general
framework (1), we can model a stochastic DoS attack on the
actuator as
α(t) = {0, 1} , t ≥ t0
F1 = B (5)
aak(t) = −u(t)
and model a stochastic data DoS attack on the sensors as
β(t) = {0, 1} , t ≥ t0
F2 = C (6)
ask(t) = −x(t).
2.3 Modelling Stochastic Data Deception Attack
In stochastic data deception attack, the adversary attempts
to prevent the actuator or the sensor from receiving a in-
tegrity data, therefore, he sends false information u˜(t) =
u(t) or y˜(t) = y from controllers or sensors. The false in-
formation can include: a wrong sender identity, an incorrect
sensor measurement or an incorrect control input; an incor-
rect time when a measurement was observed, or inject a bias
data that can’t be detected in the system. The adversary can
launch these stochastic attacks by obtaining the secret keys
or by compromising some controllers or sensors. A stochas-
tic data deception attack on the actuator can be modelled as
α(t) = {0, 1} , t ≥ t0
F1 = B (7)
aak(t) = −u(t) + bak(t)
and a stochastic data deception attack on the sensor can be
modelled as
β(t) = {0, 1} , t ≥ t0
F2 = C (8)
ask(t) = −x(t) + bsk(t)
where bak(t) and bsk(t) are deceptive data that the adversary
attempts to launch on the actuator and the sensor, respec-
tively.
3 Robust Cyber-Attacks Estimation Based onH∞
ltering technique
In this section, our objective is to estimate the stochastic
cyber-attack signal ak(t) = [ aak(t) ask(t) ]T and maxi-
mize its sensitivity based on H∞ lter technique [10]. We
assume the following conditions are satised:(1) the pair
{C,A} is observable; (2) {C,E2} has full row rank; (3)
{A,F1, C, F2} has no transmission zeros.
These assumptions guarantee the detectability of the at-
tacks in system (1). By making the residual as close to the
attack signal as possible, then it can provide all information
about the stochastic attack signal. i.e.{
ak(t) = 0, if r(t) = 0
ak(t) = 0, if r(t) = 0.
Here, we ignore the control input because it does not af-
fect to the residual when there are no modelling errors in
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the system transfer matrix. Therefore, the system (1) can be
rewritten into
.
x(t) = Ax(t) + α(t)F1aak(t) + E1w(t)
x(0) = x0 (9)
y(t) = Cx(t) + β(t)F2ask(t) + E2v(t).
We set up the following lter
.
x̂(t) = Ax̂(t) + Kr(t)
x̂(0) = 0 (10)
r(t) = y(t)− Cx̂(t)
where r(t) is the residual signal that is used as an estimation
of the cyber-attack.
We consider system (1) and lter (10). Let e(t) = x(t)−
x̂(t), then we obtain the following error dynamic:
.
e(t) = Ae(t) + F 1ak(t) + E1d(t)
e(0) = e0 (11)
r(t) = Ce(t) + F 2ak(t) + E2d(t)
with the matrices
A = (A−KC), F 1 =
[
F1α(t) −β(t)KF2
]
F 2 =
[
0 F2β(t)
]
, E1 =
[
E1 −KE2
]
(12)
E2 =
[
0 E2
]
and the vectors
ak(t) =
[
aak(t)
ask(t)
]
, d(t) =
[
w(t)
v(t)
]
. (13)
3.1 RobustH∞ Estimation of Stochastic Cyber-Attacks
Our task here is to nd an optimal estimator of the stochas-
tic cyber-attack signal. The objective of the problem is to
minimize the following performance index based onH∞ l-
ter technique.
J := E ‖Gz˜ak‖∞ = E sup
0<‖d1‖2<∞
‖r − ak‖2
‖d1‖2
(14)
where
d1(t) =
[
ak(t)
d(t)
]
.
This can be formulated according to the scheme given in
Fig.1.
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Fig. 1: Formulation of ltered cyber-attack estimation with
disturbance attenuation
Remark: Here E ‖Gz˜ak‖∞ is a new performance index.
Because the cyber-attack presented in this paper satises a
Markovian stochastic process, we introduce the mathemat-
ical expectation of ‖Gz˜ak‖∞ that is different from that of
ref.[10].
Based on the above discussion, the problem to be ad-
dressed in this paper is stated as follows. Given a prescribed
disturbance attenuation level γ > 0, design aH∞ lter of the
form (10) such that the ltering error dynamic satises the
following performance indexes: 1) the error dynamic (11)
with d1(t) = 0 is asymptotically stable; 2) the error dynamic
(11) with d1(t) = 0 (d1(t) ∈ L2([0,∞);Rn)) satises the
following performance index
J1 = E
∫ ∞
0
[‖r(t)− ak(t)‖2 − γ2 ‖d1(t)‖2]dt ≤ 0. (15)
Before presenting the main results, we rst give the follow-
ing lemmas.
lemma: The error dynamic (11) with d1(t) = 0 is asymp-
totically stable, if there exists symmetric positive denite
matrix P > 0 and matrix X such that the following inequa-
tion holds
Λ = ATP + PA− CTXT −XC < 0. (16)
Proof. Choose a Lyapunov functional for system (11) to
be
V (t) = eT (t)Pe(t)
where P is a symmetric positive denite matrix with appro-
priate dimension. Then we have
·
V (t) = ηT (t)Γη(t)
where
Γ =
⎡
⎣ ATP + PA PF 1 PE1∗ 0 0
∗ ∗ 0
⎤
⎦
ηT (t) =
[
eT (t) aTak (t) a
Ts
k (t) w
T (t) vT (t)
]
an ellipsis * denotes a block symmetry matrix. When the
d1(t) = 0, it has
·
V (t)d1(t)=0 = e
T (t)(A
T
P + PA)e(t). (17)
Substituting (12) into (17) and let X = PK, by inequation
(16) we get
·
V (t)d1(t)=0 = e
T (t)(ATP + PA− CTXT −XC)e(t)
= eT (t)Λe(t) < 0
therefore, the error dynamic (11) with d1(t) = 0 is asymp-
totically stable. The proof of Lemma 1 is completed.
3.2 H∞ Cyber-Attacks Estimation without Distur-
bances Attenuation
To detect attack faults reliably, the residual should be de-
signed to have maximum sensitivity against attack signals.
Therefore, to concentrate on the attack sensitivity, we rst
ignore the disturbance on the system (9), i.e. d(t) = 0. For
this case, the performance index (14) can be written as
J := E ‖Gz˜ak‖∞ = E sup
0<‖ak‖2<∞
‖r − ak‖2
‖ak‖2
. (18)
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For the objective of H∞ estimation, the error dynamic (11)
with cyber-attack ak(t) = 0 must satisfy the following per-
formance index
J2 = E
∫ ∞
0
[‖r(t)− ak(t)‖2 − γ2 ‖ak(t)‖2]dt ≤ 0. (19)
We obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 1: Consider the system (9) without disturbance,
i.e. d(t) = 0. Given a scalar γ > 0, there exists a H∞ lter
of the form (10) if there exists symmetric positive denite
matrix P > 0 and matrix X solving the following LMI
E(Π1) =
⎡
⎣ Φ0 Φ1 Φ3∗ Φ2 Φ4
∗ ∗ Φ5
⎤
⎦ < 0 (20)
where an ellipsis * denotes a block symmetry matrix and
Φ0 = ATP + PA− CTXT −XC + CTC
Φ1 = ρPF1 − CT
Φ2 = I − γ2I
Φ3 = −σXF2 + CT (σF2 − I)
Φ4 = −(σF2 − I)
Φ5 = (σF2 − I)T (σF2 − I)− γ2I.
When the LMI is solvable, the lterH∞ gain matrix is given
byK = P−1X.
Proof. By the proof of the Lemma 1, we can deduce that
the error dynamic (11) with the cyber-attack ak(t) = 0 is
asymptotically stable. Next, we prove J2 < 0 for 0 =
ak(t) ∈ L2([0,∞);Rn). Note that for any T > 0
J2(T ) = E
∫ T
0
[‖r(t)− ak(t)‖2 − γ22 ‖ak(t)‖2]dt
≤ E
∫ T
0
[‖r(t)− ak(t)‖2 − γ22 ‖ak(t)‖2 +
·
V (t)]dt
=
∫ T
0
ηT (t)E(Π1)η(t)dt.
Since E(Π1) < 0,
J2(T ) ≤ −λmin(−E(Π1))E
∫ T
0
(‖e(t)‖2 + ‖ak(t)‖2)dt
≤ −λmin(−E(Π1))
∫ T
0
‖ak(t)‖2 dt < 0
for any 0 = ak(t) ∈ L2([0,∞);Rn), which yield J2(t) ≤
−λmin(−E(Π1))
∫ t
0
(‖ak(t)‖2)dt < 0, then an H∞ lter of
form (10) is constructed and the lter gainK = P−1X. The
proof of Theorem is completed.
3.3 Robust H∞ Cyber-Attacks Estimation with Distur-
bances Attenuation
In practice, cyber-attacks estimation and disturbances at-
tenuation problem have to be considered together. In this
section, we further estimate the result for control systems
with disturbances. A control system under stochastic cyber-
attacks and disturbances can be modelled as the system (9).
Extending the theorem 1, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 2: Consider the system (9). Given a scalar
γ > 0, there exists a H∞ lter of the form (10) if there ex-
ists symmetric positive denite matrix P > 0 and matrix X
solving the following LMI⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
Φ0 Φ1 Φ3 PE1 −XE2 + CTE2
∗ Φ2 Φ4 0 −E2
∗ ∗ Φ5 0 (σF2 − I)TE2
∗ ∗ ∗ −γ2I 0
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ET2 E2 − γ2I
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ < 0 (21)
where an ellipsis * denotes a block symmetry matrix and
Φi(i = 0, ···, 5) is dened in (20). When the LMI is solvable,
the lter H∞ gain matrix is given byK = P−1X.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of the Theorem 1, there-
fore, the proof of the Theorem 2 is omitted.
In the case, we assume that the system (9) has no cyber-
attacks, that is to say, the stochastic processes α(t) and β(t)
are assumed to be zero. The following corollary can be ob-
tained from Theorem 2.
Corollary: Consider the system (9) without stochastic
cyber-attacks. Given a scalar γ > 0, there exists aH∞ lter
of the form (10) if there exists symmetric positive denite ma-
trix P > 0 and matrix X solving the following LMI⎡
⎣ Φ0 PE1 −XE2 + CTE2∗ −γ2I 0
∗ ∗ ET2 E2 − γ2I
⎤
⎦ < 0 (22)
where
Φ0 = ATP + PA− CTXT −XC + CTC.
The lterH∞ gain matrix is given byK = P−1X.
4 Application on the Quadruple-Tank Process
Networks
In [11] a laboratory process that consists of four intercon-
nected water tanks is presented, which will also be used here
as a suitable simulation example. In this section, based on
robust H∞ ltering technique, we will estimate the cyber-
attack on the QTP controlled through a wireless communi-
cation network, which is depicted in Fig.2. The model of the
Fig. 2: QTP with wireless communication network
QTP is a nonlinear model and applying a linear transforma-
tion it can be described as (see [11] ):
.
x = Ax + Bu (23)
y = Cx
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For operating point P [11], the system (23) has the following
parameters:
A =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
−0.0159 0 0.0419 0
0 −0.0111 0 0.0333
0 0 −0.0419 0
0 0 0 −0.0333
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
B =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
0.0833 0
0 0.0628
0 0.0479
0.0312 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ , C =
[
0.5 0 0 0
0 0.5 0 0
]
.
First assume that the system (23) is subject to a stochastic
data DoS attack aak(t) on the actuator, but it has not been
affected by the disturbance w(t), i.e.
α(t) ∈ {0, 1} , t ≥ t0
F1 = B
aak(t) = −u(t)
w(t) = 0.
Then the system (23) can be described as
.
x(t) = Ax(t) + α(t)Baak(t) (24)
y(t) = Cx(t).
As we mentioned before, because the control input does not
affect to the residual, we ignored it in the sequel of the dis-
cussion.
Applying the Theorem 1, when the attacked probability
ρ = 0.5, we obtain the γmin = 1.0000000000047. When we
take γ = 1.05, the corresponding lter matrix obtained is
K =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
0.0933 0.1426
−0.0343 0.1026
0.0657 0.2048
0.1040 0.1489
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ .
Set the initial conditions as x(0) = [0.8,−0.2, 1,−1]T and
x̂(0) = [0, 0, 0, 0]T . Fig.3. displays the time responses
of the corresponding error dynamic and the QTP state with
aak(t) = 0 and w(t) = 0. It shows that the error dynamic
is asymptotically stable and the QTP works well under this
case. Fig.4. shows the cyber-attack signal and the time re-
sponses of the residual r(t) under the attack aak(t). Obvi-
ously, the responses of the residual indicates that a cyber-
attack occurs. Fig.5. shows that the time responses of the
corresponding error dynamic and the QTP state under the
cyber-attack. Further, Fig.5. demonstrates the QTP on the
operating point P can not work normally under the attack
aak(t).
Next we consider the robust lter for the system (23) un-
der the attack aak(t) and the disturbance noise w(t), then the
system (23) can be described as
.
x(t) = Ax(t) + α(t)Baak(t) + E1w(t) (25)
y(t) = Cx(t)
where
E1 =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
−0.4545
−0.9090
−0.1195
−0.1562
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ .
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Fig. 3: The time responses of the corresponding error dy-
namic and the QTP state with aak(t) = 0 and w(t) = 0
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Fig. 4: The attack signal aak(t) and The time responses of
residual under the attack aak(t)
We take the attacked probability ρ = 0.5 and the H∞ per-
formance level γ = 1.05. Fig.6. displays the noise signal
and the responses of the residual. The corresponding lter
matrix obtained by Theorem 2 is
K =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
17.9795 37.7416
34.3542 76.2783
4.8394 10.3646
6.1680 12.9542
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
Fig.7. gives the time responses of the corresponding error
dynamic and the QTP state under the attack aak(t) and the
disturbance noise w(t), which shows the QTP can not work
normally.
Finally, we simulate the case that the system (23) is
only affected by the disturbance noise w(t), that is to say
aak(t) = 0. Applying the Corollary 1, we get the minimum
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Fig. 5: The time responses of the corresponding error dy-
namic and the QTP state under the attack aak(t)
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Fig. 6: The noise signalw(t) and the time responses of resid-
ual under the attack aak(t) and the noise w(t)
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Fig. 7: The time responses of corresponding error dynamic
and the QTP state under the DoS attack aak(t) and the noise
w(t)
H∞ performance level γ = 0.00000099. Comparing to the
minimumH∞ performance level of the system under cyber-
attack, 0.00000099 	 1.0000000000047, which indicates
the designed lter can effectively attenuate the disturbance.
Letting γ = 0.3, the corresponding lter matrix is
K = 1016
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
−2.5090 1.0290
−5.0180 2.0581
−0.6597 0.2706
−0.8623 0.3537
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
Fig.8. displays the time responses of the residual and the
QTP state under the disturbance. It is evident that no cyber-
attack occurs. Moreover, Fig.8. underline the designed lter
attenuate the disturbance very well so that the plant is still
able to work normally under the disturbance. The simula-
tion results clearly manifest that the cyber-attack has a larger
impact than a disturbance noise on the control system.
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Fig. 8: The time responses of residual and the QTP state
under the noise w(t)
5 Conclusion
This paper presents the cyber-attacks estimation for con-
trol systems under stochastic cyber-attacks and disturbances.
Based onH∞ ltering technique, lters that the residual can
provide the maximum attack sensitivity are designed. The
main work focus on attack signal estimation on control sys-
tems and we propose the models of the stochastic attacks that
a control system is possibly exposed to. We applied the pro-
posed scheme to the QTC under a stochastic data DoS attack
and a stochastic noise. The simulation results demonstrate
that designed lters efciently solve the robust estimation
problem of the cyber-attacks in practical application.
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